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THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION:
ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS AND
CONTINUING PROMISE
LARRY D. THOMPSON*
During corporate America’s Gilded Age, satirist Ambrose Bierce
defined a corporation as “[a]n ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility.”1 One need not accept that
definition to recognize that it captures a debate about corporations that
has preoccupied America for more than a century: Does a corporation
have any responsibility to society? Or, is its only obligation to maximize
profits for its shareholders? Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman famously
stated that a corporation has “one and only one social responsibility”—
“to increase its profits . . . . ”2 “Few trends,” he wrote, “could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”3 “This,” we
are told, “is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.”4
I have thought a lot about this formulation of corporate responsibility since I left the government to join PepsiCo a few years ago. My
law school mentor, Professor Joseph Vining, has written that it is incumbent upon us lawyers to contemplate our role in the world, in our profession, and in the institutions of which we choose to become a part.
We must explore “the connection between a larger sense of things—a
sense of the nature of what is and the way the world works—and what
we ourselves do and what our contribution is to the way the world will
be.”5 There are also such connections between great corporate enterprises and the societies in which they thrive and from which they derive
their support. I do not believe that a corporation must don blinders
* Copyright 2013 Larry D. Thompson. The views expressed herein are solely those
of the author. The author would like to thank Charles J. Cooper and Brian Koukoutchos,
Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, for their invaluable assistance with this article. The author also
thanks his PepsiCo colleagues, Paul Boykas and Christopher J. Bellanca, for their review
and helpful comments, as well as University of Georgia School of Law students, Austin
Bersinger and Jarrod N. Cone.
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 28 (1957). Today, corporate leadership is so pervasively distrusted that big business actually ranks below Congress on the list
of institutions in which the American public has confidence. See Lydia Saad, Americans’
Confidence in Military Up, Banks Down, GALLUP (June 24, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/121214/Americans-Confidence-Military-Banks-Down.aspx.
2. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th ed. 2002). The book was
originally published in 1962.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Joseph Vining, Propter Honoris Respectum: The Gift of Language, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1581, 1597 (1998).
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and restrict its vision to the narrow, short-term economic interests of
some of those who happen to be its stockholders at any given moment.
Our past financial turmoil demonstrates that this approach—slavish
devotion to short-term profit maximization—is economic poison. And
history shows that this cramped vision of corporate purpose is not inevitable. It is not now, and never has been, a corporation’s only option.
In the end, Milton Friedman’s exclusively economic understanding
of a corporation’s mission and responsibilities fails because it is onedimensional. That vision is arbitrarily and historically truncated along
two axes: it is far too narrow and it is far too shortsighted. I believe that a
responsible and prudent corporation of the twenty-first century must
broaden its horizons beyond the economic interests of its shareholders
to include the interests of the wider community that gave it birth and in
which it would prosper. And it must look past the short-term desire to
maximize earnings in the next quarter to contemplate, instead, sustainable corporate performance extending through—and past—a more
distant horizon.6
This Article examines the shortcomings of Friedman’s cramped
vision of a corporation’s purpose, while highlighting the historical and
legal bases and institutions that support a long-term, sustainable
approach to corporate responsibility. First, this Article reviews the origins, definitions, legal impact, and early history of the corporation. It
argues that traditional theories and definitions of corporations as having purely economic objectives, specifically “profit maximization,” serve
as only a portion of the equation management should consider in
today’s legal environment. This Article examines the role law plays in
shaping corporate duties and behavior, especially in an increasingly
globalized market. From a historical perspective, this Article focuses on
the origin of the corporation in ancient Rome and the idea that corporations were formed to further public purposes, as well as the Middle
Age emergence of responsibility and ownership division among multiple parties.
Second, this Article focuses on the history and the evolving characteristics of American corporations from the colonization period
through the industrial period and examines the impact private corporations had on the colonization of America, including venture capitalism
and corporate emphasis on public projects and welfare. This Article
describes the significance early American laws had on corporations,
forcing them to fulfill a public service and cooperate with government
entities before pursuing private goals. A shift in corporate focus, from
public purpose to private capital emerged during the Industrial Age,
causing a shift of focus to traditional profit maximization. However,
this Article argues that the underlying reasons for continued social
investment by corporations during the Industrial Age were the direct
6. The Chairman and CEO of PepsiCo, Indra Nooyi, has formulated an alternative
approach that she calls “Performance with Purpose,” which is discussed later in this
article.
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result of a positive financial impact on the company when social initiatives were taken.
Third, this Article focuses on traditional legal concepts, such as the
Business Judgment Rule, that allow managers and boards of directors to
look beyond the short-term. It discusses cases where the courts refuse
to interfere with management’s long-term decision making, though
short-term shareholder profits were not maximized. Also, this Article
examines empirical studies showing corporations that act socially
responsible in the long run. Comparisons of successful “American theory” business models and unsuccessful American and foreign strategies
highlight the devastating effect excessive dividend payments and shareholder focus can have, as well as the importance of reinvesting gains
into long-term company needs.
Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting ways corporations can
overcome management’s urge to focus primarily on current quarter
results. Corporations need to shift management and investor focus
beyond the current financial cycle due to the impact corporations have
on global economies and resources. Sustainability reporting, which
analyzes financial and non-financial factors in determining a corporation’s health, is one such method of shifting to a long-term focus. Companies should prioritize sustainability reporting and ensure the
reliability of the reported data. Further, this Article argues that corporations should alter the structure of executive compensation to prevent
managerial shortsightedness, and incorporate sustainability as a critical
factor for managerial success. Ultimately, corporations must take it
upon themselves to shift away from a short-term, bottom-line culture to
a forward-looking culture in order to ensure long-term economic success for shareholders while also encouraging environmental and social
progress to secure a brighter future for the entity itself and its
shareholders.
I.

THE CORPORATION

AS A

LEGAL PHENOMENON

Rather than jumping straight into the middle of the debate about
the nature and extent of a corporation’s responsibilities, and to whom
they are owed, we might first step back and ask, as Professor Vining has,
why corporate responsibility should ever be a question at all:
We do not ask such a question about you or me. You might say of
me that I’m not a responsible person or I’m being irresponsible in
the circumstances, but your assumption is that I should be responsible or try to be. You and I . . . care about the consequences of
our actions. There is tort law out there with its threat of damages,
and we pay premiums for insurance against liability. . . . But that is
not the reason why we are careful if we are responsible people.
We actually don’t want someone else to be hurt, and if we really
don’t care, and really are indifferent to the consequences of our
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actions, we are viewed as a bit of a psychiatric case and a threat—
certainly not someone who can be dealt with in ordinary affairs.7

Thus we—you and I—are not purely economic actors who have
only financial motives and who respond only to market signals; so why
would we ever assume that our corporations, which human beings created to serve human needs, are purely economic actors?8 Yet we are
told that “business” is different and that otherwise universally-applicable
norms of responsibility are an invidious interference with business and
an insidious corruption of its central institution, the business corporation.9 Friedman’s formulation of corporate purpose is so familiar that
it has almost become a cliché, and this may obscure just how radical it
truly is. “Profit maximization,” under the finance theory taught in business schools, or the theory of the firm taught in economics departments, “does not mean . . . a primarily monetary interest, a primary
concern for economic growth, more income, fewer costs. It means truly
‘maximization,’ a sole concern for profit.”10 Under this view, corporate
responsibility for any other value is denied: “all substantive value is
external, none is internalized, and all mental activity is calculation.”11
For example, Enron hewed tightly to the Friedman approach and had a
state-of-the-art corporate code of conduct, which led only to “the ascendance of unenlightened self-interest—winning for yourself; I win, you
lose. The Enron . . . rationalization was, ‘We didn’t do anything wrong,
because we didn’t break the law.’ ”12 Of course, Enron did break the
law—but that was merely where the carnage of the wreck finally landed.
The corporate vehicle had left the track and lost its bearings much earlier when it decided to steer with an exclusive focus on the immediate
profits of its shareholders.
However familiar it may be to our ears, Friedman’s view of the corporation is necessarily incomplete because he saw the corporation
exclusively through the lens of an economist—although one of our
greatest economists, to be sure. The shortcoming of this view is that the
corporation is not solely an economic phenomenon—it is a legal phenomenon as well. A business corporation does not rise spontaneously
from the intersection of contracts among private parties in the marketplace. A corporation is a legal fiction—an artificial person “existing
only in intendment and consideration of law,”13 and we create these
7. Joseph Vining, Competition, Corporate Responsibility, and the China Question, 45 L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 83, 83 (2003).
8. See id. at 88 (“ ‘Business’ is not a set of value-free machines. ‘Business’ is a set of
living human organizations allowing us as individuals to live in a way we can stand to
live—to have lives as individuals we can justify to ourselves and each other.”).
9. Id. at 83.
10. Joseph Vining, The Effect of Economic Integration with China on the Future of American Corporate Law 1 (Law & Econ. Working Papers Paper No. 11).
11. Vining, supra note 7, at 88.
12. Interview by Lenny T. Mendonca & Matt Miller with Daniel Yankelovich, Public
Opinion Analyst & Social Scientist, in La Jolla, Cal. (2007), in 2 MCKINSEY Q. 65, 69
(2007).
13. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *464. Sir Edward Coke opined that a
corporation’s creation “rests only in intendment and consideration of the law.” Case of
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artificial persons in our own image. We are social and moral actors with
responsibilities to our community—why should we assume that our corporations are not? They have whatever characteristics we endow them
with and whatever responsibilities we choose to impose on them. A corporation has perpetual life; it governs itself through by-laws of its own
choosing, it can buy and sell property and can sue and be sued in its
own name—and, in law, its liability is limited to the assets that it holds
in its own name. A corporation possesses these attributes only because
the state has willed that it be so. It is therefore more than a little
strange to suppose that a body corporate owes nothing to the body politic that created it as an act of legislative grace.
Little, if anything, in American law endorses such a wholly calculating, single-minded pursuit of profit as an acceptable basis for corporate
behavior. “It is not the case that American law commands or even
allows you, if you are doing your duty to the corporation, to think that
in your social role as a business decision-maker you are to play a game
with everything and everybody, the law included . . . .”14 Both the
American Law Institute (ALI) and the Business Roundtable spurn this
narrow and cynical approach to corporate governance. The Business
Roundtable recognizes that corporations must serve the interests of
society as well as their shareholders,15 and the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance provide that, “[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct
of its business . . . [m]ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”16 Indeed, the ALI has specifically refused to define a corporation’s mandate as “profit maximization,” embracing instead the
position that company decisions should be made merely “with a view to
enhancing corporate profit.”17
To give you an idea of just how far the ALI standard is removed
from unbridled laissez-faire, the ALI’s formulation of corporate purpose parallels that of the Company Law enacted in 1999 by the People’s
Republic of China: corporate decisions are to be made “with a view to
improving economic return.”18 The ALI position is not an aberration.
Other components of American corporation law, including securities
laws, constituency statutes in most states, the common law of Delaware
(when closely read), rules of professional responsibility for lawyers and
accountants, and the very applicability of criminal law to corporations
Sutton’s Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that “[a] corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law”).
14. Vining, supra note 10, at 3.
15. The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46
BUS. LAW. 241, 244 (1990).
16. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(b) (1994).
17. Vining, supra note 7, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE106.txt

204

unknown

Seq: 6

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

9:43

[Vol. 29

as such (not merely to their officers and agents) all reject an exclusive
focus on profit as the sole standard for making business decisions.19
This and other legal restraints on a company’s single-minded pursuit of profit are not unique to American law. A global perspective is
warranted not as some sort of academic nod to comparative law but as
part of the cold, practical reality of a multinational corporation operating in dozens of countries. A company may be incorporated in only
one state or nation, but if it ventures beyond those borders to do business or run facilities in other jurisdictions around the planet, it should
expect to be held accountable by the rules that those jurisdictions have
adopted, not by whatever standards apply to the company in its home
town. In Japan, which is the world’s third-largest economy, the courts
held the Chisso Chemical Company on Minimata Bay liable for the horrific birth defects caused by the company’s discharge of mercury-laden
water. It mattered not that the discharged water met every statutory
and regulatory environmental standard, nor that Chisso’s treatment
methods were superior to those of any other member of its industry.20
In China, which is now the world’s second-largest economy,21 the corporation law has recently been amended and no longer speaks of
“strengthening socialist spiritual civilization.”22 If this suggests a degree
of convergence with Western capitalist definitions of corporate purpose, it should be tempered both with the observation that Chinese law
still contains explicit mandates that a corporation “respect” and “undertake” “social responsibility”23 and with the reminder that the ALI’s own
formulation of corporate purpose, even if not that of China, still
describes the pursuit of profit as merely one element of business decision-making.24
Undoubtedly, there is a major gap between the commands of the
law and the actual conduct of corporations in response to the law, and
this is surely at least as true in China as in the United States. But my
point is that any corporation that would operate in both China and the
United States must attend to the social-responsibility standards of both
nations. A global corporation will inevitably be affected by the gravitational pull of each of these economic giants—and by the smaller influence of a dozen (or more) other nations. The concept of corporate
19. See, e.g., The Business Roundtable, supra note 15, at 244 (stating that corporations serve social interests); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
770, 810 (2005) (stating that standard formulations of managerial success include managerial latitude to serve non-corporate public welfare, and corporate boards may consider
other “stakeholders” besides shareholders); Vining, supra note 10, at 3–4.
20. See Vining, supra note 7, at 85–86.
21. In the last year China displaced Germany for the number three spot. In 2009,
Chinese GDP was forecast to grow eight percent; this, while the American economy was
contracting at an annual rate of six percent (according to figures for the second quarter
of 2009).
22. Vining, supra note 10, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Vining, supra
note 7, at 87 (discussing the earlier 1993 and 1999 Companies Laws of the People’s
Republic of China).
23. Vining, supra note 10, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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social responsibility in any one country will thus be shaped by other
nations’ views of the primacy of profit as the corporation’s raison
d’etre.25
To be sure, business corporations, both East and West, often
appear to act as if they acknowledge no value other than profit, and
therefore a theory of the corporation that posits that exclusive end will
sometimes be sufficient in itself to account for, to explain, corporate
behavior.26 But this confuses the descriptive with the prescriptive, the
“is” with the “ought.” Law is a normative enterprise that seeks to regulate and change the world, not merely to understand it. Law is therefore tuned to answering questions that economics, by itself, can merely
beg.
For example, the normative legal inquiry into corporate social
responsibility considers the consequences of business decisions on such
groups as employees, retirees, customers, suppliers, and communities.
“In economic theory these effects are called ‘externalities’ but,” as Professor Vining has observed, “that assumes an answer to the question of
what is internal and what is external to a business corporation, an
answer that economics itself cannot give and only the law can
provide.”27
II.

THE CORPORATION

AS A

HISTORICAL ARTIFACT: ROMAN ORIGINS

Friedman’s narrow view of corporate obligations contemplates the
business company as an idealized economic construct, ignoring its
actual historical origins.28 When first conceived in Roman law two mil25. See Vining, supra note 10, at 7.
[W]ill the development of China’s economic institutions and China’s integration into the world economy, and our own, be a special challenge in an unexpected way? Not competitively, but internally, in what we come to project? Will
it have the perhaps surprising effect of blunting the late-twentieth century pressure in the United States to see profit as the sole concern of business decisionmaking, and ultimately make the way we think fifty years hence more humane
than it might otherwise have been?
Id.
26. Id. at 4–5.
[T]his pressure reflects an increasingly serious claim on Western thought in general. ‘Ideology’ does not quite describe what can be observed. A widespread
project of ‘naturalizing’ captures it better. Exclusive interest in profit, biological
or economic, is what evolutionary biologists and many political and social scientists assume in their work of prediction and explanation of the human world,
and it has been a useful and productive assumption. But moving from assuming
it for predictive purposes, to asserting and teaching it, and, beyond that, to
enforcing it as a norm, is a difficult thing to resist, by those who work with it or
by others, because it fits a much wider thrust in Western thought that positively
wants to see and understand each of us, and each of our institutions, as only selfseeking systems responding to the actions of other self-seeking systems.
Id.
27. Vining, supra note 7, at 84.
28. This mutual reinforcement between the legal and historical perspectives on any
given subject is unsurprising given Holmes’ famous dictum that a page of history is worth
a volume of logic. Legal discourse is usually about—and, if it wishes to avoid obscurity, is
always about—the actual and the concrete rather than the abstract. “Law . . . turns away
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lennia ago, the corporation was a legal entity licensed by the state to
further public purposes.29 Corporations are artificial bodies existing
only in public law, organizations born of, and owing responsibilities to,
the broader community.
Roman jurists pioneered the fundamental concept of an association licensed by the state and thereby endowed with a collective identity
apart from its human members.30 As late as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, English and American lawyers were routinely employing the precedents and vocabulary of Roman civil law in describing and
defining corporations.31 The Roman nobility created tax-farming societates in which they held shares with the corporate entity, rather than
each individual noble, being responsible to Rome for collecting the
taxes.32 The corporation also prospered in Rome’s plebian social
strata, where guilds known as collegia, corpora, and universitates organized
tradesmen and specialized laborers.33 The Roman collegia also provided services to the government and to their communities, including
distributing grain to the needy, keeping the peace, and lending money
to families for special expenses such as funerals and marriages. A collegium could own property, had perpetual existence through the succession of its members, could sue and be sued, and made by-laws for its
own governance.34 Whether societates of aristocrats or collegia of tradesmen, these corporations could exist only if permitted by the state, and
the state, ever jealous of its authority, allowed them to exist only if they
served the state’s purposes as well as their own.
III.

BREAKING BREAD TOGETHER: COMPANIES

AND

GUILDS

During the Middle Ages, the Roman corpora provided ready precedents for jurists wishing to recognize collective entities distinct from
their individual members.35 “Bodies corporate” facilitated associations
from accepted forms of academic discourse—away from proposition isolated and stated
first, its establishment as truth and its linkage to other propositions by bonds of incontestable logic.” Vining, supra note 5, at 1581. Ultimately, “law is a story. [It is] the particular
and the concrete, in constant tension with the statistical and the generalizing in those
various and highly developed modes of thought that cannot admit the importance of
what is only an individual instance.” Id.
29. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *455–62; NATHAN ROSENBERG
& L. E. BIRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL WORLD 196 (1986); Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 25, nn.9–11 (2002); Avi-Yonah, supra note 19, at 773–74;
FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE: CIVILIZATION & CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH
CENTURY 440 (1979) (English translation 1982).
30. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY—A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 4 (2003).
31. See BRAUDEL, supra note 29, at 434; JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 27–28 (1832) (reprint, N.Y. Arno Press
1972).
32. The tax farming societates were among the most prominent and effective early
Roman corporations. See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 30, at 4.
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 192.
35. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 30, at 12.
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as varied as the mayor and common people of a city, the dean and
chapter of a cathedral, or the head and fellows of a college.36 Corporations, whether of ecclesiastics or lay tradesmen, municipalities or universities, enabled groups to transmit their wealth, their learning and
their traditions from one generation to the next.37
The business entities that took form in medieval Europe were generally family firms whose members shared everything: capital, labor,
bread—and liability.38 The family firms grew in size and complexity
and, because trade was usually their business, they also grew across
political borders, acquiring investors not just from outside the family
but from outside the realm. The time-tested arrangement of dividing
ownership into shares served these expanding enterprises well, and corporations in politically weak medieval city-states thrived in direct proportion to their utility to the state. The share companies even “handled
tasks properly those of the state,” such as financing the public debt or
paying for military expeditions.39 The boundaries between public and
private life that modern minds take for granted were blurred.40
IV.

EXPLORING THE WORLD: THE GREAT
CHARTERED MERCHANT COMPANIES

Merchants involved in foreign trade also formed corporate guilds
known by the title “Merchant Adventurers,” because they risked their
money on ventures in foreign lands. This is the origin of the modern
term “venture capitalist.” The only way to raise money for trade and
colonization was to share the risk through joint stock companies, and
the only way to induce private capital to invest was to award a royal
charter giving a company of adventurers a monopoly on trade with that
portion of the globe: hence the East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay
Company, the Virginia Company.41 These chartered companies
“bestraddled the public and private sectors,”42 and the adventurers represented the sovereign that granted their charters: for example, the
Muscovy Company paid the expenses of the embassy that King Edward
sent to the court of the Russian Czar.43
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *455–59.
37. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 30, at 12–13.
38. The word “company” came to English from the Old French word compaignon—
companion—literally, “one who breaks bread with another.” The French word in turn is
derived from the Latin words cum and panis—“together with bread.” Thus “company”—
the noun denoting a commercial enterprise, a business organization—arose from words
used to describe a relationship among individuals formed not at arms’ length, but elbow
to elbow, side by side around a common table while breaking bread.
39. BRAUDEL, supra note 29, at 440; see also JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J.
MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 60 (1997).
40. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 39, at 58.
41. See BRAUDEL, supra note 29, at 439; MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 30,
at 17–18.
42. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30, at 17.
43. ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 193.
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It is little wonder that Blackstone referred to corporations as “little
republic[s].”44 Indeed, “empires” might be a more appropriate label.
The Hudson’s Bay Company, chartered in 1670 and still the oldest surviving commercial corporation in North America, was once the largest
landholder on the planet, controlling 1.5 million square miles of territory and even issuing its own currency.45
The public responsibilities of these corporations were spelled out
in their charters, which required the company’s management to attend
to the interests of stakeholders in addition to those who owned the
company’s stock. The charter of the Virginia Company directed the
Company’s Council to govern the colony not just “for the Good of the
Adventurers” who owned its stock, but also for all “the inhabitants” in
Virginia.46
Some of the good that came from English colonial expansion is
attributable in significant part to the corporation. In 1619, the Virginia
Company introduced representative government to America by convening its first General Assembly.47 This body, selected by colonists who
were rarely shareholders, was equal in stature to the Company’s own
board of directors: acts of the General Assembly became law in Virginia
once confirmed by the Company’s management in London, and Company orders did not bind the colonists in Virginia “unless they be ratified in like Manner in the General Assembly.”48 The Virginia
Company’s rules made the interests of the colonists paramount—even
though most of the colonists were not shareholders.49 Thus the history
of the corporation in America began with the most dramatic and most
consequential form of corporate social responsibility that can be
imagined.
V.

PUBLIC SERVICE: THE CORPORATION

IN THE

NEW REPUBLIC

Given that the first American corporations gave birth to the first
American colonies, it is little surprise that American law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not draw sharp distinctions
between the corporation and the state. Public service and private profit
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *456.
45. The company now runs department stores and other retail establishments in
Canada.
46. Second Charter of The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of
the City of London for the First Colony in Virginia (May 23, 1609), reprinted in 1 HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER & MILTON CANTOR, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 11 (10th ed.
1988).
47. Ordinance for Virginia (July 24, 1621), reprinted in COMMAGER & CANTOR, supra
note 46, at 13–14. The discrepancy in dates is due to the loss of the original Ordinance of
1619; the one enacted in 1621, on which this discussion is based, is believed to be virtually
identical to the original enactment.
48. Id. at 14.
49. The overriding corporate purpose was “to settle such a Form of Government
there as may be the greatest Benefit and Comfort of the People, and whereby all Injustice,
Grievances, and Oppression may be prevented, [and to provide] a Remedy of all Inconveniences [and to ensure the] advancing of Increase, Strength, Stability, and Prosperity of
the said Colony[.]” Id. at 13.
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were not incompatible—indeed, the corporate form was available to
pursue the latter only insofar as it contributed to the former. The corporation was the means by which a state could channel private capital
to achieve public ends such as the building of a bridge, turnpike or
canal. Governments employed the corporate form “to do things that
rational businessmen would not do because they were too risky, too
expensive, too unprofitable, or too public, that is, to perform tasks that
would not have gotten done if left to the efficient operation of
markets.”50
These eighteenth-century corporations needed much more from
the state than a charter—a mere license to exist. Businessmen whom
the government wished to entice into building bridges across rivers
would usually invest only if the government offered a monopoly: if
nobody else would be allowed to build a bridge or to operate a ferry
nearby, you knew that your bridge was assured enough business to pay a
good return. Other endeavors were not merely risky without government concessions—they were wholly impractical or even impossible. A
bank needed the right to issue currency on its own credit—only the
government could grant that privilege. Would-be builders of canals,
turnpikes and railroads needed the power of eminent domain to ensure
availability of the land along the planned route—only the government
could delegate such authority.51 As one court put it, such concessions
would be conferred only,
[I]n consideration of services to be rendered to the public. . . . It
may often be convenient for a set of associated individuals, to have
the privileges of a corporation bestowed upon them; but if their
object is merely private or selfish; if it is detrimental to, or not promotive of, the public good, they have no adequate claim upon the
legislature for the privileges.52

This dual concept of corporate purpose helps to explain the
extraordinary popularity of the corporation as a business form in the
early United States. Although the joint-stock company (other than the
great exploratory charter companies) was moribund in England in the
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, corporations proliferated in
America as the young nation built out its infrastructure.53 American
states chartered corporations for business purposes—albeit businesses
with a public purpose, such as turnpikes or canals—far more than other
nations, where corporations continued to be primarily the province of
non-profit endeavors such as municipalities or universities.54
50.

WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORAMERICA 41 (1997).
51. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at
116–18, 125–26 (1977); ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 194.
52. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 112 (quoting Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mutual Assurance
Soc’y, 14 Va. 315, 347–48 (1809) (emphasis in original)) .
53. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30, at 43.
54. Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. &
MARY Q. 51, 55–56 (1993).
PORATION IN
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Part of the corporation’s appeal was that, in a country without an
aristocracy, it enabled the concentration of capital necessary for economic development. John Quincy Adams, among many others, advocated the joint-stock company “as a ‘truly republican institution’ that
allowed investment by ‘the poor, . . . females and children, . . . the
widow and the orphan.’ ”55 Promoting ownership of vital internal
improvements by the general public, as an alternative to leaving them
in the hands of a few wealthy individuals or, worse still, in the hands of
indolent (or even corrupt) government bureaucrats grasping for a sinecure, was not only good business—it was a positive civic virtue.56
The popularity and effectiveness of the corporate form exploded
in the decades following American independence. When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, there were only six non-bank business corporations in the entire United States. Within a decade that number had
multiplied by a factor of forty-five.57 Three-fourths of those corporations were formed to accomplish internal improvements: canals, turnpikes, bridges, water supplies. The public obligations of business
corporations were, accordingly, taken very seriously. Lack of a sufficient public purpose was grounds for denying a corporate charter; failure to fulfill public responsibilities was grounds for revocation of a
charter.58 Government action short of outright revocation was also visited upon early American corporations to ensure their contribution to
the public good. Towns and legislatures regulated the tolls charged by
turnpike corporations and the rates charged by grist mills.59 A mill
owner might be forbidden to put the mill to uses other than those for
which the proprietors had originally obtained its corporate charter
from the legislature or its water privileges from the town.60 In particular, the state did not part with its power of eminent domain lightly, and
the measures employed to ensure its responsible exercise by a corporation could be extreme. In an 1823 opinion, New York’s Chancellor
Kent explained that:
55. Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1894 (1989) (quoting a speech on manufacturing that Adams gave in
1832) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic].
56. See id. at 1894–95.
57. ROY, supra note 50, at 49.
58. Id. at 48. Sometimes the enforcement mechanism was judicial, in the form of a
quo warranto hearing, where the public inquired by what right has this entity presumed to
take a challenged action. See, e.g., Wadsworth Land Co. v. Piedmont Traction Co., 78 S.E.
297, 298 (N.C. 1913) (quo warranto remedy if a transportation company abuses its eminent domain power); D. Mark Jackson, Note, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of
SLAPPs: Revisiting New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491, 517 (2001);
Richard Grossman, Revoking the Corporation, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 141, 145 (1996); ROBERT BENSON, CHALLENGING CORPORATE RULE 41–42 (1999).
59. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 118, 125; see also San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
National City, 174 U.S. 739, 755 (1899) (explaining that a railroad cannot fix rates to
maximize its profits while ignoring the rights of the public because “such a corporation
was created for public purposes, and performed a function of the state, and . . . its right to
exercise the power of eminent domain, and to charge tolls, was given primarily for the
benefit of the public [.] . . .”).
60. HORWITZ, supra note 51, at 118.
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Turnpike roads are, in point of fact, the most public roads or
highways that are known to exist, and, in point of law, they are
made entirely for public use, and the community have a deep
interest in their construction and preservation. They are under
legislative regulations, and the gates are subject to be thrown
open, and the company indicted and fined, if the road is not
made and kept easy and safe for the public use.61

Seventy years later, the United States Supreme Court held that railways are likewise “public corporations organized for public purposes”
that have been given “valuable franchises and privileges,” and they
therefore “primarily owe duties to the public of a higher nature even
than that of earning large dividends for their shareholders.”62 Such
transportation companies were granted a public franchise, and one
condition of their public service was the legal obligation to serve all
comers without discrimination63—a principle that lives on in the modern common-carrier doctrine.
VI.

THE CORPORATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: SELF-INTEREST,
RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD

As America’s infrastructure was constructed, the center of gravity
for corporations shifted gradually from public dedication of private
capital, to public purposes, to private direction of how and where capital should be invested. This movement, like so much in the history of
American corporations, began in New England. In 1830, the Massachusetts legislature declared that petitioners for corporate charters no
longer had to be engaged in public works to be awarded the privilege of
limited liability. In 1837, Connecticut took the next step and permitted
most business enterprises to become incorporated by a registration procedure that no longer required a special legislative charter.64 But it is a
measure of the abiding power of the principle of corporate public purpose that such statutes did not spread quickly. When Delaware, the
modern mother of corporation law, enacted a general incorporation
statute in 1899, it was only the twelfth state to do so.65
61. ROY, supra note 50, at 51.
62. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 332–33 (1897).
63. ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 194.
64. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30, at 46; see also CHARLES PERROW,
ORGANIZING AMERICA: WEALTH, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 36–37
(2002). In part, this relaxation of incorporation requirements was a reform movement
aimed at the political favoritism—and sometimes outright corruption—that had attended
incorporation so long as it required a special legislative grant for each applicant company. ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 199.
65. ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 29, at 199. The exceptions to this general
trend—even today—are public utility companies. Whether streetcar lines, water companies, electric companies, telephone companies or cable television companies, such concerns require the grant of a specific government franchise, even if they no longer need a
special act of the legislature merely to incorporate. Id. at 194–95. At the outset, such
enterprises were understood to be “natural monopolies” and therefore, they required a
government grant of monopoly privileges to be viable. And, of course, the power of eminent domain was often essential to the success of such companies. Technological

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE106.txt

212

unknown

Seq: 14

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

9:43

[Vol. 29

The substitution of simple registration procedures for petitions for
individual legislative enactment of corporate charters has been criticized as fatally diluting the requirement of corporate public service:
“On the practical level, [general incorporation laws] made the corporate form more widely available than it had previously been; on the
ideological level, they abandoned the implication that corporate privileges should only be granted for special, public purposes.”66 But this
interpretation misses the point: unlike other business forms such as
partnerships, a corporation requires the approval of the state simply to
exist. It is an artificial person, not a natural being. If you fail to get a
license for your dog, your dog still exists; this is not true for a corporation. A corporation is a political creation, not an automatic, inevitable
result of economic change or technological development. The corporation and its special features—limited liability, perpetual existence, the
power to sue and be sued in its name—are not attributes that private
actors could, without the assistance of the state, recreate by themselves
through the mechanisms of private contract.67
Even during the heyday of the robber-barons, the Supreme Court
recognized that the law remained within the gravitational influence of
the original concept of the corporation:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws
of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.
Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as
it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a
state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain
franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire
how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had
been abused.68
advances have recently diminished the claims of natural-monopoly status but transportation and utility companies remained the archetype of the huge American corporation
until well into the twentieth century. As late as 1929, half of the two hundred largest
corporations in America were in the transportation or utility industries. Id. at 194.
66. Incorporating the Republic, supra note 55, at 1883.
67. Limiting the corporation’s liability to its creditors to the assets it holds in its
own name (distinct from the assets owned by its shareholders) may actually be less important to corporate vitality than the mirror-image concept of “entity-shielding”—the protecting of corporate assets from the claims of the personal creditors of the corporation’s
myriad shareholders. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 394 (2000); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2006).
68. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911) (holding that a corporation, a creature of state law, must submit its books to examination by the state) (citation
and quotation marks omitted); see also Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 389
(C.C.D. Cal. 1883), aff’d 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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Perpetual, institutionalized antagonism between management and
labor, corporation and community, manufacturer and consumer is not
good for business. It is not a sound basis for sustainable corporate
growth, and it is therefore not in the corporation’s best interests.
Henry Mills, a Unitarian preacher who ministered to the factory
workers of Lowell, Massachusetts, described companies who recognized
this principle as imbued with “the sagacity of self-interest.”69 Company
towns were built across America because corporations understood that
“[w]ell-housed and well-educated workers would be more efficient than
their slum-dwelling, feckless contemporaries.”70 In the early years of
the twentieth century, Proctor & Gamble pioneered disability pensions,
Sears established a retirement plan, U.S. Steel contributed ten million
dollars a year to employee welfare programs, and International Harvester instituted profit-sharing.71 All of these programs were established not just because they were good for the employees, but because
they were good for business.
VII.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: SHIELDING MANAGERIAL
DISCRETION TO LOOK AT THE BIG PICTURE
AND THE LONG TERM

Even when corporate strategies to address social concerns arguably
redound to the shareholders’ injury, the “business judgment rule” protects managers who aim at sustainable, responsible business growth.72
The courts “will not disturb the judgments of a board of directors ‘if
they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.’ ”73 Henry Ford
stated that it was his ambition “ ‘to employ still more men; to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to
help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are
putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business.’ ”74
Ford proposed to achieve this goal by two measures: first, reinvesting
69. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30, at 75.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 75, 111.
72. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., Justice Alito dismisses the argument that the purpose of for-profit corporations is
simply to make money, stating that
[w]hile it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to
make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. Forprofit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to
mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy conservation measures that go beyond what the law
requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
73. In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted) (applying
Delaware law).
74. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (quoting Henry
Ford’s testimony).
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profits to acquire an iron smelting business that would reduce his steel
costs and second, cutting the price of his cars by about twenty percent.75 The latter effort was part of Ford’s plan to make his cars available to a wider market; the former revealed his zeal for vertical
integration to minimize costs—it was said he wanted to own the grassy
pastures that grazed the sheep whose wool was gathered to manufacture
the upholstery in his Model-Ts.
The Dodge brothers, who were among the company’s shareholders, sued Ford to block the expansion into the steel business and to
compel the company to distribute the accumulated profits as dividends.
The court compelled a greater dividend than Ford wished and seemed
to have done so largely because Ford’s own testimony was tantamount
to a declaration (1) that the “the Ford Motor Company has made too
much money . . .” and (2) that Ford would “continue the corporation
henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary institution . . . .”76 The court
deemed this an abuse of discretion and held that “it is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of
a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for
the primary purpose of benefitting others . . . .”77 However, the court
flatly refused to interfere with Ford’s expansion into the steel business:
directors’ “power over [profits] is absolute so long as they act in the
exercise of their honest judgment. They may reserve of them whatever
their judgment approves as necessary or judicious for repairs or
improvements, and to meet contingencies, both present and prospective.”78 The facts of Dodge—and Ford’s testimony in particular—were
extreme and have rendered it a curiosity. It is now generally cited for
the rule that courts will not second-guess corporate management and
that “plans must often be made for a long future, for expected competition, for a continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture.”79
The modern business judgment rule is better represented by Shlensky v. Wrigley,80 in which stockholders brought a derivative suit against
the principal owner of the Chicago Cubs to force him to install lights so
that games could be played at Wrigley Field at night, to remedy the
disappointing attendance at home games and the Cubs’ consequent
multi-year operating losses.81 The court was unmoved by plaintiff’s alle75. Id. at 683.
76. Id. at 683–84.
77. Id. at 684.
78. Id. at 682 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 684. See, e.g., Lytle v. Malady, 566 N.W.2d 582, 593 n.25 (Mich. 1997)
(citing Dodge for the proposition that courts should not second-guess corporate management); Levin v. Miss. River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (describing Dodge as
having adopted a general rule against judicial interference with corporate management
and distinguishing facts in Dodge as anomalous); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business
Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 98 (2004) (describing the Dodge
decision as “famously refus[ing] to interfere with Henry Ford’s decision to expand Ford
Motor Company’s manufacturing facilities” and “explaining that ‘judges are not business
experts’ ”).
80. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
81. Id. at 777.
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gations that Wrigley was ignoring the shareholders’ interest and imposing his personal view “that baseball is a ‘daytime sport’ and that the
installation of lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”82 The court
opined that “the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well
be considered by a director” and that “the long run interest” of the
company “might demand” consideration of the impact of night games
on the community.83 The court held that second-guessing the company’s management was “beyond [its] jurisdiction and ability”84 and
that the allegations of the complaint therefore could not survive a
motion to dismiss—“the court did not even permit Shlensky to come to
bat.”85
The business judgment rule thus shields—and thereby promotes—
managerial discretion to serve the corporation’s long-term prospects.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,86 the Supreme Court of
Delaware refused to enjoin the Time-Warner merger at the behest of
Paramount, a disappointed corporate suitor. The Time board’s objection to a merger with Paramount focused on intangible, long-term
considerations:
The primary concern of Time’s outside directors was the preservation of the “Time Culture.” They believed that Time had become
recognized in this country as an institution built upon a foundation of journalistic integrity. . . . [The directors] feared that a
merger with an entertainment company would divert Time’s focus
from news journalism and threaten the Time Culture.87

The court held that “precepts underlying the business judgment
rule militate against a court’s engaging in the process of attempting to
appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term versus a shortterm investment goal for shareholders.”88 Such matters are best left to
the corporation’s managers, because their broad mandate to direct a
company’s affairs includes a conferred authority to set a corporate
course of action, including time-frame, designed to enhance corporate
profitability. “Thus, the question of ‘long-term’ versus ‘short-term’ values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to
chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without
regard to a fixed investment horizon.”89
82. Id. at 778 (some interior quotations omitted).
83. Id. at 780.
84. Id.
85. Bainbridge, supra note 79, at 97 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
86. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
87. Id. at 1143 n.4; see also id. at 1149 (“The Time board maintained that the
Warner transaction offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders and, unlike
Paramount’s offer, did not pose a threat to Time’s survival and its ‘culture.’ ”).
88. Id. at 1153.
89. Id. at 1150; see also id. (“[A] board of directors, while always required to act in an
informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term, even in the context of a takeover.”).
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EXTENDING CORPORATE HORIZONS: WHY SHOULD AN ENTITY
ENDOWED WITH PERPETUAL LIFE OBSESS ABOUT
THE NEXT QUARTER’S EARNINGS?

Corporate discretion to look past the short-term economic interests of shareholders and consider additional stakeholders, such as
employees, suppliers, and the community, was expanded in the 1980s
when a host of states enacted laws—generally known as “constituency
statutes”—explicitly authorizing such consideration, largely as a means
of enabling local companies to fend off unwelcome takeover
attempts.90 Aside from the abstention rationale supporting the business judgment rule—the recognition that courts are ill-suited to substitute their judgment for that of corporate managers—there is a
substantive justification for the rule as well: long-term study has demonstrated that corporate social responsibility is good for business. Careful
review of more than fifty quantitative studies reveals that such principled corporate performance pays off and that “portraying managers’
choices with respect to [social responsibility and financial performance] as an either/or tradeoff is not justified in light of [thirty] years of
empirical data.”91 Aiming for economic performance imbued with ethical purpose does not entail sacrificing the bottom line.
The CEO of PepsiCo, Indra Nooyi, has formulated an approach
that she calls “Performance with Purpose”: a program of sustainable
growth that combines robust financial returns with giving back to the
communities that the company serves, by meeting consumer needs for
a spectrum of convenient foods and beverages while reducing the company’s impact on the environment through water, energy and packaging initiatives, and supporting the company’s employees with a diverse
and inclusive global corporate culture. Thus, during the company’s
October 8, 2009 earnings call, Ms. Nooyi described PepsiCo’s research
and development focus on
[T]rue science based differentiation [that] will enable us to accelerate our health and wellness transformation. We have put in
place an outstanding R&D team with complementary skills and
experience and we have married them with our insights organization, which we are continually upgrading. While we are already
seeing benefits from some of the work in our 2010 pipeline, we

90. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRDIGE, supra note 30, at 150. Connecticut’s statute actually mandates that a corporation consider such interests. See id. In the United Kingdom,
the 1985 Companies Act likewise forced directors to consider the interests of employees
as well as shareholders. Id.; see generally Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999).
91. Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24
ORG. STUD. 403, 427 (2003), available at http://community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articlespublications/sri/article-orlitzky-et-al.pdf; see also id. at 426 (“First and foremost, market
forces generally do not penalize companies that are high in corporate social performance; thus, managers can afford to be socially responsible.”).
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don’t expect immediate major breakthroughs. This is an area
where sustained investment is critical.92

Economic performance and ethical practices ultimately merge and
reinforce each other synergistically. Across a broad spectrum of quantitative inquiries, “corporate social performance is positively correlated
with [corporate financial performance] . . .” and, as statistical analysts
are wont to say, “the relationship tends to be bidirectional and simultaneous . . . .”93 In layman’s terms, “[c]orporate virtue . . . is rewarding in
more ways than one.”94
The “Performance with Purpose” agenda is not radical. It is simply
the conviction that there is more to business than the earnings cycle.
Some corporations have pursued similar ends with different formulations for at least the last half-century. Hewlett-Packard, the original resident of Silicon Valley, has been saying for more than fifty years that
profits are not the principal goal of its business.95 In 1951 the CEO of
Standard Oil of New Jersey argued that corporate management’s job is
“to maintain an equitable and working balance among the claims of . . .
stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.”96 The
American heritage of this idea is much older still: de Tocqueville identified the “principle of self-interest rightly understood” as the engine that
drives corporations and other associations to that place where “private
interest and public interest meet and amalgamate.”97
This is not a call for corporations to compromise, let alone to abandon, their commercial mission to pursue opportunities aggressively and
to maximize return on capital. Whatever one may think of Adam
Smith’s famous “invisible hand,” he clearly got this part right: the greatest contribution any company can make to society will always be increasing the pie on the table at which we all dine.98 For all the universities
and libraries built by the robber-barons and all the good works financed
by Boeing, Google, and Microsoft do not equal the good they have
done humanity through the jobs they have provided, the products they
have manufactured, and the wealth they have generated. All that is
required is recognition that “shareholder value is a result, not a strat92. PepsiCo Earnings Conference Call (Oct. 8, 2009), transcript at 4 (available from
Thompson Reuters Streetevents, www.streetevents.com).
93. Orlitzky, supra note 91, at 427.
94. Id.
95. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLRIDGE, supra note 30, at 189.
96. Id. at 118 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
97. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial Press ed.) (1838).
98. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, at 32 (Andrew Skinner ed.,
Penguin Classics 1999) (1776) (In a capitalist system, an individual “neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [H]e intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor
is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the
public good.”).
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egy,” and that a corporate manager’s “main constituencies are [her]
employees, [her] customers and [her] products.”99
A responsible corporation must both broaden and extend its horizons. Not only should it widen its view beyond its shareholders to
include the interests of the community that gave it birth, it should also
look past the next quarterly report to envision sustainable performance.
Even when considered solely in the economic terms he used to frame it,
Milton Friedman’s argument that a corporation’s only social responsibility is “maximum profits for stockholders” begs the question: which
stockholders is he talking about? Does he mean buy-and-hold equity
investors who are with the company for the long haul? If so, the corporation maximizes its return by adopting long-term strategies that anticipate changes in the marketplace and that aim for sustainable
performance, even if that means lower earnings now. Or does he mean
day-traders and other stock speculators who are gambling on the market and desire large, rapid movements in stock price? The corporation
would have to behave in radically different ways to maximize their
profits.100
Analysts of western stock exchanges estimate that about eighty percent of stock market value “depends on expectations of corporate cash
flows beyond the next three years.”101 One study concluded that
ninety-five percent of a company’s value “comes not from existing contracts reflected in financial statements but from expectations of future
sales and purchase contracts.”102 It therefore seems to follow that
responsible corporate leadership, even if viewed exclusively in financial
terms, mandates planning for the long term even at the cost of not meeting the earnings projections for the next quarter. In a fairly recent
interview, Unilever chief Paul Polman explained:
I do not work for the shareholder, to be honest; I work for the
consumer, the customer. I discovered a long time ago that if I
focus on . . . the long term to improve the lives of consumers and
customers all over the world, the business results will come.103

Indeed, I would argue that a longer-term perspective is dictated by
a fundamental aspect of a corporation’s nature: it is endowed by law
99. Michael Skapinker, Replacing the ‘Dumbest Idea in the World,’ FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2010, available at www.ft.com/comment/columnists/michaelskapinker (quoting former
General Electric CEO Jack Welch).
100. See Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123561746955678771
(“[Corporations] pursue complex, uncertain projects that take years or decades to reach
fruition: developing brand names, building specialized manufacturing facilities, exploring and drilling for oil and gas fields, or developing new drugs, products and
technologies.”).
101. Ian Davis, What is the Business of Business?, MCKINSEY Q. (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.asq-qm.org/resourcesmodule/download_resource/id/415/src/@random4b
b253ffcdfcd/.
102. RESEARCH & POLICY COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST: FOCUSING CORPORATIONS ON LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 19 (2007) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter COMM.
FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST].
103. Skapinker, supra note 99.
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with perpetual existence—a life of its own not constrained by the lives
of its mortal shareholders. It can convey its traditions, its learning, and
its wealth from one generation to the next. To posit a corporate duty to
maximize the next quarter’s earnings at the expense of next year’s (or
the next decade’s), is to squander the opportunity conferred on a corporation by one of its defining features.
IX.

RESURRECTING

THE

“AMERICAN THEORY”

OF

BUSINESS PLANNING

Given that the current global economic meltdown was ignited by
heedless and toxic short-term thinking in America’s financial markets,
it is ironic that a presumption in favor of long-term corporate planning
was largely an American invention. Well into the twentieth century,
British corporations routinely distributed as dividends more than threefourths of their profits.104 In contrast, in the late nineteenth century,
some American corporations began to retain and devote a growing portion of their earnings to capital equipment and internal investment
opportunities. This difference in perspectives was vividly illustrated in
1881, when a representative of British shareholders in the Pennsylvania
Railroad arrived in Philadelphia to demand (unsuccessfully) that all
earnings be distributed as dividends.105 The policy of sacrificing shortterm stockholder gains in order to reinvest and grow the business was
denounced by the British as the “American theory” of business planning.106 Given how much the American industrial revolution eclipsed
that of Europe, it is hard to quarrel with the philosophy. The most
successful American industrial enterprises at the start of the twentieth
century were those that relied primarily on retained earnings to finance
their operations.107 This was especially true with respect to huge companies that tried to expand by means of consolidating many smaller
entities. Eighteen huge consolidated enterprises—including Westinghouse and United States Leather—spiraled into insolvency and had to
be reorganized because of a rush to pay high dividends at the expense
of reinvestment.108
Often the two forms of corporate myopia—viewing only a narrow
constituency of shareholders and looking only at the short-term—
induce parallel, simultaneous errors. An example of the opposite
approach demonstrates the point. After 9/11, every American airline
laid off employees—except Southwest Airlines. It alone bucked the
104. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 39, at 192.
105. Id. at 193.
106. Id.; see also BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 379 (2d ed.
1940).
107. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 39, at 205.
108. Id. at 194; see also id.
The haste with which these early dividends were declared was at a variance with
the principles of sound finance. . . . Why was such lack of conservatism shown by
these corporations? Able financiers were on the directorates of nearly every
case. . . . One motive that often prompted declaration of dividends was a desire
to make a market for the stock.
(citation omitted).
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rush to cut short-term costs and looked instead to husbanding the
resource that was its workforce. This paid off in terms of confident and
secure and loyal employees who continue to give Southwest the highest
customer-satisfaction ratings in the industry. It also gave Southwest an
edge in competing with other airlines for talent: when the company
announced 3,000 new jobs, it received 120,000 applications.109 Southwest has also benefited from making long-term commitments to its suppliers. Early in this decade, it undertook a multi-year contract for
aviation fuel and was consequently unperturbed by the shockwave that
rocked other airlines when oil prices skyrocketed in 2008.
We therefore need not break new ground to reject the obsession
with meeting the next quarter’s earnings projection that has tyrannized
Wall Street and helped spawn the financial crisis that currently plagues
us. Prudent corporations, like prudent households, take heed of the
common-sense maxims that one does not burn the furniture to heat the
house tonight and one does not gorge oneself on tomorrow’s seed
corn.110 Recognizing these truths is particularly important in a world
with an expanding population and diminishing resources. Some years
ago Stuart Hart articulated the challenge of developing a “sustainable
global economy” this way:
Although we may be approaching ecological recovery in the developed world, the planet as a whole remains on an unsustainable
course. . . . [T]he scourges of the late twentieth century—
depleted farmland, fisheries and forests; choking urban pollution;
poverty; infectious disease; and migration—are spilling over geopolitical borders. The simple fact is this: in meeting our needs,
we are destroying the ability of future generations to meet
theirs. . . . [C]orporations are the only organizations with the
resources, the technology, the global reach, and, ultimately, the
motivation to achieve sustainability.111

What the present circumstances call for is the revival of another
ancient, common-law concept: stewardship—the responsible management of the estate of another. In this case, on a global scale, the
“estate” is the planet and the “other” is the generation yet to come. As
Professor Vining has observed, such stewardship is both “alternative
and supplement to democracy”112—including corporate democracy. It
is “trusteeship for those to be born in the future who do not yet have a
voice.”113
109. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30, at 189.
110. During a quarterly earnings conference call in 2008, Indra Nooyi rhetorically
asked whether “it is prudent to do something radical to deliver [forecast performance]
numbers in [periods of] extreme volatility, and the answer is no because we’re running
the company for the long term. You never run a company where you burn the furniture
for the short term.” PepsiCo Q3 Earnings Conference Call (Oct. 14, 2008), transcript at 11
(available from Factset: callstreet, www.callstreet.com).
111. Stuart L. Hart, Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World, HARV. BUS. REV.
67, 67 (Jan.–Feb. 1997).
112. Vining, supra note 5, at 1598.
113. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE106.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 23

THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION

20-APR-15

9:43

221

A rapidly-growing part of the investor community understands this
stewardship. Socially-responsible investing is growing at a pace faster
than the broader universe of all professionally-managed investments.
Nearly one out of every nine dollars under professional investment
management in the United States—a sum that comes to $2.7 trillion—
is managed according to “socially responsible” criteria.114 Although
some socially responsible investors are focused on a single issue, others
push corporations to adopt long-term outlooks and to recognize and
deal with long-term risks.
X.

SOME SUGGESTED TREATMENTS FOR WALL STREET’S ADDICTION
TO SHORT-TERM RESULTS

Corporate America’s fixation on short-term thinking presents a
paradox: a legal entity designed to transcend the mortal limits of
human lifetimes is managed with a myopic focus on what happens in
the next three months. The term “paradox” comes from the combination of the Greek words para —“beyond”—and doxa—“opinion.”
Therefore, to address—to transcend—a paradox, one must look
beyond the apparent contradiction that is embodied in conventional
thinking, and the conventional thinking at issue here is some of Wall
Street’s obsession with the immediate earnings cycle. We must induce
both investors and managers to shift their perspectives to consider
more than just the immediate bottom line of the next quarterly earnings report, to envision socially responsible, sustainable corporate performance, and to work toward it. Investors need to be shown the
financial advantages of sustainability, and managers need to be given
financial incentives to overcome their addiction to short-term results.
The former requires the promotion of metrics that measure sustainable
performance and thereby reveal to investors the value of companies
that pursue performance with purpose; the latter requires changing the
formula for compensating company executives to relieve them of a perverse incentive structure.115
A.

Sustainability Reporting

Sustainability metrics attempt to quantify the value in a company
that is not always fully represented by its financial report. These metrics
are sometimes referred to generally as non-financial reporting. Significant market value derives from intangible assets such as reputation, the
capacity to innovate, and a commitment to social well-being that almost
always redounds to the benefit of global corporations in many ways.116
“Corporate Sustainability is a business approach that creates long-term
114. See SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTTRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, at ii (2007), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/
Publications/07_Trends_%20Report.pdf.
115. As explained below, The Aspen Institute has been a leader in focusing attention on the ills of short-term business planning.
116. See About Sustainability Reporting, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www
.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx .
ING
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shareholder value by embracing opportunities and managing risks
deriving from economic, environmental, and social developments.”117
The creation of measures to report and compare the sustainability of
different companies serves not only companies that adopt this business
approach but also the growing number of investors who “ ‘perceive sustainability as a catalyst for enlightened and disciplined management’ ”
and therefore as a crucial element of enduring corporate success.118
The leading sustainability reporting institutions are the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), created by the Ceres organization in 1997119 and
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (“DJSI”), first published in 1999.120
The DJSI comprises the top ten percent of the 2,500 largest companies in the world based on an assessment of long-term environmental,
economic and social criteria, such as corporate governance and plans
for responding to global climate change. Dow Jones has defined a set
of criteria (and associated weightings) to assess the opportunities and
risks presented to companies.121 Generally applicable economic criteria include, for example, a corporation’s regime of corporate governance, code of conduct, regulatory compliance programs, and risk and
crisis management; environmental criteria include the company’s environmental reporting; and social criteria include the company’s philanthropy, labor practices and recruiting and personnel policies for
attracting and retaining talented employees.122 A company is also
assessed with respect to criteria specific to particular industries; for
example, assessments for food or product-manufacturing companies
might include consideration of their brand management, marketing
practices, and research and development programs.123
The shortcomings of current sustainability reporting regimes,
including GRI and DJSI, are that they are not embraced by all corporations and the information on which they are based lacks a degree of
standardization that makes apples-to-apples comparisons somewhat
problematic. The entire point of sustainability reporting is to provide a
117. See Corporate Sustainability, DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDICES, http://www.sustainability-indices.com/sustainability-assessment/corporate-sustainability.jsp .
118. See Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes Reveal Tech Winners and Losers, SILICON REPUBLIC (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.siliconrepublic.com/clean-tech/item/23580-dow-jonessustainability-in (quoting Dow Jones Sustainability Index).
119. See What is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting
.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx. GRI became an independent entity and relocated to the Netherlands in 2002. See id.
120. See Dow Jones Sustainability World Enlarged Index Guide Book, at 7 (Jan. 2008),
available at http://www.sustentabilidad.uai.edu.ar/pdf/negocios/djsi/djsi_world_guide
book_91.pdf.
121. See ROBECOSAM, DJSI 2014 REVIEW RESULTS, at 3 (Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.sustainability-indices.com/images/DJSI_Review_Presentation_09_2014_final
.pdf
122. See Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, at 2 (Nov. 2010), available at https://www
.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/brochure_info/Dow_Jones_Sustainability_Indexes_
Brochure.pdf.
123. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index actually comprises several indices for different regions, including World, North America, Euro STOXX, Asia-Pacific, Korea and
Japan. Id. at 4.
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standard of information that is credible, comparable, and consistent
across all companies. These goals cannot be achieved if companies can
effectively rate themselves and disclose only the information that they
wish. For example, under GRI Guidelines, corporations decide for
themselves which of the two reporting options (known as “Core” and
“Comprehensive”) they wish to declare that they have met.124 Furthermore, it is entirely optional for a company to have either an external
auditor or GRI itself check the company’s self-declaration of the reliability of its sustainability report.125 The corporation may also choose
whether to prepare its sustainability report “ ‘in accordance’ with the
[GRI] Guidelines”—that is, to actually adhere to them—or to take an
“incremental approach” that requires mere “partial adherence to the
reporting principles.”126 GRI explains that it “encourages” external or
independent assurance of data reporting because such verification will
naturally enhance the “credibility and quality of sustainability reports,”
but it hastens to add that “[i]ndependent assurance of a sustainability
report is not a requirement” even for reporting declared to be formally
“in accordance” with GRI’s Guidelines.127
Thus, there are opportunities for improvement in sustainability
reporting. No matter how good a process is, no matter how sound its
methodology, its results have little meaning if the data that are put into
the process are unreliable or incomplete.128 To be fair, any shortcomings in the GRI regime are certainly not due to lack of care or a
shortage of intellectual acumen on the part of those who created and
support the GRI. The Global Reporting Initiative is, as its name reveals,
a first attempt—an effort from the bottom up to achieve some order
and comparability in systematic quantification and reporting of sustainability. GRI by itself has no means of imposing its Guidelines from
the top down, and while this limits their impact, the GRI framework is
nonetheless a laudable, groundbreaking step on the path to a world in
which corporate sustainability will be an essential element of planning
by both investors and corporate managers.
The Dow Jones Sustainability Index has an additional carrot to
encourage companies to meet its reporting requirements—inclusion as
a member of an economic index created by one of the world’s most
venerated financial reporting institutions. The DJSI process is different
from that of the GRI Guidelines, because the former not only has a
daily monitoring program that compares a company’s actual behavior
124. See Global Reporting Initiative FAQs, at 15 (Dec. 2014), available at https://www
.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G4-FAQ.pdf.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id.
128. Charles Babbage, the nineteenth-century English mathematician and engineer
who first conceived of a programmable computer, despaired of those who failed to grasp
this inherent problem: “On two occasions I have been asked, ‘Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you
put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?’ . . . I am not able
rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.”
CHARLES BABBAGE, PASSAGES FROM THE LIFE OF A PHILOSOPHER 49 (Martin Campbell-Kelly
ed., 1994).
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with the sustainability policies it proclaims, it also provides a measure of
independent review through an outside accounting firm (Deloitte AG).
However, Deloitte examines and verifies only the methodology applied
by DJSI’s research arm (SAM Research AG), and (at least to a limited
extent) the accuracy of that agency’s compilation of sustainability
scores. Neither Deloitte nor any other independent body verifies, nor
even reviews, “the data, data collection, collation, and validation
processes used by the individual companies submitting information to
[DJSI].”129
It does not have to be this way. Sustainability reporting can be
more than an exercise in “happy” corporate communications. Even if
we assume that sustainability reporting may inevitably be less rigorous
than the financial data presented in a company’s 10-K, due to the play
in the joints inherent in assigning a numerical value to such things as
corporate governance structures or crisis management protocols, this
does not mean that sustainability reporting cannot be made more
exacting and reliable.130 For example, although PepsiCo’s participation in the DJSI, like that of many companies, began largely as a communications initiative, all of the information submitted to DJSI must
now be verified through the company’s Disclosure Committee, consisting of the general counsel, the chief internal auditor, the head of investor relations, the controller, and the head of financial planning and
analysis.131 Even if the numbers assigned to sustainability criteria cannot be crunched quite as rigorously as budget figures or market-share
statistics, the fact remains that many companies report such data and
trumpet their ranking on the DJSI in order to influence the decisions of
investors, and in the end that means that sustainability reporting should
be considered subject to the standards that the securities laws already

129. Deloitte, Independent Assurance Report by Deloitte AG to SAM Research AG, at 1
(Sept. 2014), available at http://www.sustainability-indices.com/images/independentassurance-report-by-deloitte-AG-to-robecosam-ag-2014.pdf.
130. That said, one should take care not to overrate the meaningfulness of the
supposedly “hard numbers” set forth in a 10-K statement. It is worth remembering that
there is far more latitude for judgment and interpretation in financial data than we are
often willing to admit. As the Committee for Economic Development has noted, the
“apparent, but false, precision of financial statements feeds the narrow focus of managers,
investors, directors, and analysts on the earnings-per-share number.” COMM. FOR ECON.
DEV., BUILT TO LAST, supra note 102, at 19. “[S]tock analysts, the investing public, and
regulators must recognize the inherently judgmental character of accounting statements
and financial information. Ranges of values rather than precise numbers should be
explained and understood as such. In addition, financial statements should be supplemented with non-financial indicators of value.” Id. (citation omitted).
131. Processing sustainability information through a Disclosure Committee may not
be enough. Companies also need rigorously defined metrics and data collection protocols, centralized reporting on sustainability initiatives, dedicated resources for data collection, and an audit process to verify the results. Finally, responsibility within the company
for the ultimate sustainability reporting effort should be clearly defined, for example
through designation of a chief sustainability officer or the designation of a committee of
high-level executives.
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impose on other “ ‘material’ information . . . that would be important to
a reasonable investor in making his or her investment decision.”132
It has been said that, just as a corporation has no soul, so “[a] corporation cannot blush.”133 But as a practical matter this is simply not
so. Even if a corporate logo cannot display embarrassment or chagrin,
the human beings who manage a corporation can be profoundly
embarrassed, even shamed, by revelations about the company’s misconduct, by its refusal to acknowledge responsibility for harms it has
caused, by its slowness to provide relief measures, or by its failure to live
up to the principles that it espouses in corporate filings and press
releases. The very existence of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and
the Global Reporting Initiative confirm that both investors and corporate directors care about whether a company is perceived as socially
responsible, and a company’s reputation in such matters can be either
an asset or a liability in the marketplace.134
Perhaps it is time for Congress and the SEC to undertake inquiry
and invite public comments further defining the “materiality” of a company’s sustainability reporting, and consider whether social, environmental and governance risks (and a company’s performance in dealing
with them) should be addressed in a company’s official public filings.
And perhaps we even need an international organization of business
enterprises to make the case for this proposal (and others) even to
international regulators.135 This role is filled in the United States by
such organizations as the Aspen Institute’s Business and Society Program,136 the Ceres corporate network,137 and the Committee for Economic Development.138 But perhaps, in addition to these country132. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)
(defining “material information”); see also Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1084 (1991); TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445–49 (1976).
133. Joseph Auerbach, Speech: Corporate Ethics: An Elusive Euphemism, 5 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 169, 178 (1997) (quoting an English corporation case from 1837) (quotation marks omitted).
134. See Global Reporting Initiative FAQs at 3 (“Significant market value derives from
intangible assets such as reputation, the capacity to innovate, and a commitment to social
well-being.”), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/FAQs/FAQSustainabilityReporting.htm; see also Dow Jones Sustainability World Enlarged Index Guide Book,
supra note 120, at 13 (“[A] company’s involvement and management of critical environmental, economic and social crisis situations . . . can have a highly damaging effect on its
reputation and its core business.”).
135. See Indra K. Nooyi, Leading to the Future: Capitalism Is Great For Economic Recovery,
in 525 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 406 (2009) (proposing such an organization and
explaining need for “metrics, communications, policies and executive remuneration all
towards this objective of creating long-term value.”).
136. See ASPEN INST., www.aspeninstitute.org; DIRS. & BDS., www.directorsandboards
.com.
137. See CERES, www.ceres.org.
138. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., www.ced.org. For example, the CED has recommended that the “relevance, transparency, and utility of company-reported information”
be improved by “redesigning business reports to include useful non-financial indicators of
value, such as those proposed by the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, and
dropping the use of quarterly earnings guidance.” COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST
supra note 102, at 19.
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specific business organizations and their analogs around the world, we
need a G50 group of global corporations to facilitate discussion with
the G20 nations. In the meantime, we who act in the marketplace can
demand greater rigor. I therefore issue the following challenge to all
publicly traded corporations: All of the sustainability information that a
company submits to DJSI or any other body, and all sustainability claims
and programs that a company announces to the public, must first
undergo systematic and methodical review by the company’s own disclosure committee.139 It is time for sustainability to be more than communications hype; it is time for corporations to “walk the talk.”140
B.

Executive Compensation

Diagnosing the causes of the recent economic crisis has become
something of a parlor game similar to discussions among historians
about what caused the fall of the Roman Empire. But to my mind the
greatest contributing factor was the willingness of business leaders to
take on excessive risk in order to improve on last quarter’s earnings or
to satisfy Wall Street’s expectations for next quarter’s profits. As Judith
Samuelson of the Aspen Institute and Lynn Stout of the UCLA Law
School memorably put it: “Our economy didn’t get into this mess
139. Although there is no legal requirement that a company maintain a disclosure
committee, the SEC recommends that corporations establish committees to consider the
materiality of information about the company and to manage the company’s disclosure
obligations. Those obligations are imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which mandates
that companies required to report financial information to the SEC establish (and vouch
for) internal procedures and controls for disclosing information material to the company’s performance. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241(a)(4), 7262 (2006). And, under Section 409
of the Act, such material information must be publicly disclosed on a real-time basis. See
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(l) (2006). At a minimum, such disclosure committees review all
reports made to the SEC and the guidance and press releases the company issues about
its expected earnings. Some companies have their committees also review the information presented on the company’s website and presentations the company makes to rating
agencies. My proposal is that every company should subject the sustainability information
it discloses to the same rigorous process of review that its disclosure committee applies to
other company information of a material nature.
140. In addition to the Global Reporting Initiative discussed above, two other organizations—the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), a U.S.-based, nonprofit organization that recently appointed Michael Bloomberg and former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro as its board chair and vice chair, and the International Integrated
Reporting Council (“IIRC”), a global coalition of regulators and investors—have emerged
as leaders in developing sustainability reporting standards. SASB’s mission is to develop
sustainability accounting standards to complement financial accounting standards that
help public companies “disclose material factors in accordance with SEC standards” in
periodic filings with the SEC, such as annual reports, and they are working with corporations to identify, industry by industry, a minimum set of sustainability issues that may have
a significant impact on most, if not all, corporations in that industry. See SUSTAINABILITY
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., www.sasb.org. IIRC developed a framework of “integrated
thinking” focused on enabling companies to communicate in an integrated report how a
range of financial and non-financial factors may materially affect their ability to create
value over time. See THE INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, www.theirrc
.org. In addition, several countries and exchanges, including Denmark, France and
South Africa, have begun requiring companies to report or explain certain sustainabilityrelated initiatives.
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because executives were paid too much. Rather, they were paid too
much for doing the wrong things.”141 Meanwhile, outside investors—
with little ready access to the data needed to assess whether the company is making decisions that will promote sustainable growth by investing in employees, communities, innovation, and supplier and customer
relationships—all too often take the easy route of simply checking
whether the share price was up or down today.142
The latter problem can be addressed, in part, by promoting credible and consistent metrics of relating to policies that promote sustainable growth, as discussed above. Part of the solution to the first problem
could be infusing sustainability into corporate planning by expressly
basing executive pay on the company’s performance in addressing sustainability, especially when many objectives are immediately accretive to
a company’s bottom line and others clearly support growth of longterm shareholder value. Instead of relying exclusively on share price or
other short-term financial metrics, directors should thoughtfully design
executive compensation programs that motivate executives to accomplish the right long-term and sustainable growth goals. Emphasizing
these, rather than short-term financial results, will push executives to
make choices promoting long-term goals instead of making the sort of
risky bets that contributed to the recent economic crisis. For example,
at Dutch chemical company Akzo Nobel, executive pay depends in part
on the company’s position on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.143
Service to particular constituencies, such as suppliers, customers, or
business partners, can be incentivized, too. For example, executive
compensation at Marriott is tied in part to ratings by the company’s
franchise holders.144
PepsiCo announced in its 2009 annual report specific numeric
goals in the areas of human, environmental, and talent sustainability,
such as improving its water-use efficiency and increasing healthful eating options in its global product portfolio.145 PepsiCo integrates these
same sustainability goals into executive performance targets that determine incentive compensation.
Recent legislative proposals in Washington—grouped generally
under the rubric of “say-on-pay”—would require all public companies
to give shareholders an opportunity to cast a non-binding advisory vote
to approve the executive compensation disclosed in annual proxy state141. See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 100, at A13.
142. Id.
143. See Skapinker, supra note 99 .
144. Id.
145. See 2009 Annual Report – Performance with Purpose, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico
.com/annual09/performance_with_purpose.html. Specifically, PepsiCo pledged to
improve water and electricity efficiency by 20% per unit of production by 2015; to reduce
fuel-use intensity by 25% per unit of production by 2015; to provide access to safe water to
three million people in developing countries by 2015; to create partnerships to increase
U.S. beverage recycling rates to 50% by 2018; to reduce packaging weight by 350 million
pounds by 2012 (avoiding the creation of a billion pounds of landfill waste); and to
reduce added sugar per serving in key global food brands by 25%, sodium per serving by
25%, and saturated fat per serving by 15%.
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ments.146 This step is welcome, and in fact many companies, including
PepsiCo, have voluntarily committed to implement such votes. However, my principal concern is less about who sets executive pay than
about how it is set. A say-on-pay vote changes the players but does not
address the substantive criteria used to set management’s pay. The perverse incentive structure of executive compensation will persist so long
as the input for compensation calculations—even those made by independent committees and reviewed by shareholders—is limited to supposedly objective financial data that too often emphasizes short-term
earnings and ignores long-term sustainability.147
Indeed, increasing the input of shareholders—many of whom are
just as likely as managers to respond principally, perhaps exclusively, to
short-term swings in stock value—may in some instances exacerbate the
problem. Professor Stephen Bainbridge148 argues that the basic premise behind the say-on-pay mandate will fail to prevent future economic crises and may further crises because “shareholders and society
do not have matching goals when it comes to executive pay.”149 Society
wants managers to be more risk adverse, while many shareholders will
encourage managers to take “higher risks in the search for higher
returns to shareholders.”150 Although Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay man146. See Treasury Department Fact Sheet: Ensuring Investors Have a “Say on Pay” (June
10, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
fact_sheet_say%20on%20pay.pdf. Initiatives to bring shareholders into the executivecompensation process are also among the key features of bills proposed by Senator
Charles Schumer and Representative Gary Peters. See Ronald D. Orol, Bills Splitting Role of
Chairman and CEO Shifting in Capitol Legislation Would Limit Efforts to Throw Out Rules
Empowering Shareholders, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/story/print?guid=404BF3D3-C2DF-46CF-9F71-747F9E36A0DB; Press Release, Rep.
Peters, Author of Shareholder Empowerment Act, Says Strengthening Shareholder Rights
Key to Reining in Executive Pay, Reckless Investments (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://
peters.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=22&parentid=21&sectiontree=21,22&itemid=193;
Press Release, Legislation Includes “Say-on-Pay” Measure to Give Shareholders a Vote on
Lavish Executive Compensation Packages (May 19, 2009), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=313468.
147. The movement to de-emphasize quarterly earnings is gaining momentum.
In recent years, over 200 companies have discontinued earnings guidance and
the percentage of listed companies offering guidance has fallen. . . . A membership survey taken by the CFA Institute, a prominent organization of investment
analysts, showed that three-quarters of respondents preferred that companies
move away from quarterly earnings guidance and towards providing more information on a company’s long-term prospects. A key obstacle to change is the
close link between short-term performance and incentive pay for company managers, fund managers, and analysts.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST supra note 102, at 25; see also Samuelson & Stout,
supra note 100, at A13 (“Top executives who receive equity-based compensation should
be prohibited from using derivatives and other hedging techniques to offload the risk
that goes along with equity compensation, and instead be required to continue holding a
significant portion of their equity for a period beyond their tenure.”).
148. Stephen M. Bainbridge is the William D. Warren Professor of Law at UCLA
School of Law.
149. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round
II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1819 (2011).
150. Id. at 1819.
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date151 seeks to align management and shareholder interests, the result
many times is continued short-term focus by management.152 To
ensure shareholder support for their compensation packages, directors
may be influenced to standardize executive compensation packages and
focus on well-established short-term financial metrics rather than more
long-term sustainability goals unique to their organization.153
The directors of a company, who are in the best position to be
informed of and to understand the company’s long-term strategic interests, should be allowed to base executive compensation in part on the
company’s long-term sustainability, even if that characteristic is hard to
quantify in the traditional—albeit sometimes specious—form of “hard”
numerical data. In the say-on-pay environment, directors rightfully will
also have the task of persuading shareholders that these sustainability
objectives are the right yardstick for determining executive compensation and are good for the company.154
CONCLUSION
Pauline Maier, one of the most perceptive students of the corporation’s history in this country, describes Americans of our Revolutionary
era as “salvag[ing] from a rejected past those English legal traditions
and practices that suited their republic . . . .”155 “They rescued the
corporation,” a moribund institution in eighteenth-century England,
“recreate[d] it as an agent of opportunity rather than a recipient of
privilege,” “harness[ed] it more firmly to the public good,” and
employed it “to empower individuals whose resources were unequal to
their imaginations.”156 It is my hope that, in this contemporary period
of transformation, we might find that our corporations can once again
151. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010).
152. Bainbridge, supra note 149, at 1818–19.
153. See id. at 1810–11 (explaining how power essentially shifts to a small number of
controlling institutional investors and advisory firms, who will likely require a standardized package that may not properly or automatically suit all of the roughly 10,000 U.S.
reporting companies’ needs).
154. In The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn Stout posits that “[t]he widespread perception that corporate directors and executives have a legal duty to maximize shareholder
wealth plays a large role in explaining how shareholder value thinking has become so
endemic in the business world today.” LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 24
(2012). However, “the business judgment rule holds that, so long as a board of directors
is not tainted by personal conflicts of interest and makes a reasonable effort to become
informed, courts will not second-guess the board’s decisions about what is best for the
company—even when those decisions seem to harm shareholder value.” Id. at 29. Lynn
Stout maintains that “[t]o build enduring value, managers must focus on the long term as
well as tomorrow’s stock quotes, and must sometimes make credible if informal commitments to customers, suppliers, employees, and other stakeholders whose specific investments contribute to the firm’s success” and that “gauging the performance of the
American corporate sector solely by the share price performance” ignores “the diverse
interests and values of different shareholders to focus only on those of a very narrow
subset that is particularly short-sighted, opportunistic, indifferent to external costs, and
lacking in conscience.” Id. at 109–11.
155. Maier, supra note 54, at 83.
156. Id.
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marshal resources equal to our imaginations. Our corporations are no
longer the “little republics” that Blackstone described centuries ago:
fifty-one of the 100 largest economies in the world (as measured by
gross domestic product) are American corporations.157 Of the top 150
economies, 69 are corporations.158 To put this in even more concrete
terms, General Electric’s annual revenues eclipse the GDP of such
nations as Romania, the Philippines, New Zealand and Egypt.159
The world’s problems are the corporation’s problems because we
are all in this together. Society needs corporations and corporations
need society, at least if they wish to continue to have consumers for
their products and services. Therefore, a proper representation of the
needs of society, the environment and the corporation is not the classic
Venn diagram of three overlapping circles with a sweet spot where they
intersect. It is instead three concentric rings, with the business—which
cannot exist except within the society that created and sustains it—in
the middle, surrounded by the society, which in turn is imbedded in the
environment, apart from which it cannot exist.160 Our problems will
not be solved in any one person’s lifetime. A generation comes, a generation goes, but the Earth abides forever.161 We are therefore most
fortunate to have institutions that straddle national borders, that span
generations of humankind, that possess the wherewithal and the expertise to make a difference, and that have the advantage—and the responsibility—of taking a long perspective.

157. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 666, 666 n.237 (2007).
158. Countries’ Gross Domestic Product in US Dollars, WORLD BANK, http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?order=wbapi_data_value_2011%20wb
api_data_value%20wbapi_data_value_last&sort=desc&display+default (last visited Aug.
16, 2012); Our Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations, FORTUNE MAG., May 23,
2011, at F1.
159. Compare GENERAL ELECTRIC, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 26, available at http://www
.ge.com/ar2008/pdf/ge_ar_2008.pdf, with National Accounts Main Aggregates Database,
UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIV., http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp
(data for 2007); see also Kerr, supra note 157, at 660 n. 201 (offering additional comparisons). Of course, such comparative status is always subject to change and has been particularly volatile in this century during the current recession. Thus, as recently as May of
2001, only the economies of the G8 nations were larger than that of General Motors, a
company that has more recently fallen on hard times. See Comparison of Revenues among
States and TNCs, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/tables-and-charts-on-social-and-economic-policy.html. Whatever the rankings at any given moment and whatever the fortunes of any given company, the
dominance of corporations among the world’s economies will endure.
160. Rajkumar S. Adukia, An Insight into Sustainability Reporting/Triple Bottom Line
Reporting 6, http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/12982260/665041536/name/hbsrpro.pdf
(last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
161. Cf. Ecclesiastes 1:4.

